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Thin Political Markets: 
The Soft Underbelly of Capitalism 
 
– Karthik Ramanna 
 
Abstract 
“Thin political markets” are the processes through which some of the most 
complex and critical institutions of our capitalist system are determined – e.g., our 
accounting-standards infrastructure. In thin political markets, corporate managers are 
largely unopposed – because of their own expertise and the general public’s low 
awareness of the issues. This enables managers to structure the “rules of the game” in 
self-serving ways. The result is a structural flaw in the determination of critical 
institutions of our capitalist system, which, if ignored, can undermine the legitimacy of 
the system. I provide some ideas on how to fix the problem. 
 
This article is based on my book Political Standards, The University of Chicago Press, 2015. I am grateful 
to the many individuals whose feedback improved the book. For suggestions on this article, I thank Joe 
Badaracco, Jon Cell, Bob Kaplan, Mal Salter, Bob Simons, Jake Soll, Eugene Soltes, Rahula Strohl, and 
Lou Wells.  
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* * * 
Imagine you are Shaquille O’Neal at the height of his dominance. Given your 
eminence and expertise, you have been asked by the commissioner of the National 
Basketball Association (NBA) for input on how to improve the game. As O’Neal, you 
know you are a poor free-throw shooter but a dominant inside player. So you decide this 
is your shot at improving your ability to score. You propose that all dunks should be 
worth four points instead of two. You also propose that players should get four free 
throws if they are fouled on a dunk instead of two. The NBA, deferring to your wisdom 
and experience, institutes these proposals. Now you, as O’Neal, already commanding the 
scene, have total control. 
Sound like a good idea? Yes, perhaps, if you are O’Neal. But absolutely not, if 
you are any other player – or a fan. In fact, if something like this were really to happen in 
the world of basketball, there would probably be a public revolt. And rightly so. But 
strangely, situations such as this are routinely occurring in the world of business rule-
making. And, because few from the public are actively keeping tabs, the Shaqs of finance 
and industry are getting away with it.  
For instance, look at our system of accounting rules – known as Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles or GAAP. This system is at the heart of the modern 
market economy. Good accounting rules are to capitalism what good plumbing is to your 
home. You don’t think about the intricacies and structure of your home’s plumbing, but if 
it doesn’t work, your home would scarcely be habitable. The same is true of accounting 
rules. Although out of the day-to-day eye of even most businesspersons, accounting rules 
are essential to defining and measuring fundamental notions such as “profits” and 
“assets.” The efficient allocation of capital and the effective evaluation of investments in 
a market economy depend in part on the nature of accounting rules.  
For all of its importance to our economy, there has been very little public light 
shed on the nature of accounting rules in the United States and beyond. Accounting rules 
are a social construction. Contrary to widespread perception, there are no “natural laws” 
when it comes to accounting rules – there are no absolute rights and wrongs. GAAP in 
the United States and elsewhere is determined through a political process dominated by 
experts immersed in the various complex specialty-functions that underlie modern 
business. Like for other rules governing business, the political process underlying 
accounting rules can be led astray and can become “captured” by the specialists running 
the show. So it is imperative that from time-to-time we engage in a systematic evaluation 
of the political process.  
For the last ten years, I have been engaged in such an evaluation for our system of 
accounting rules. I have studied numerous specific accounting issues largely outside the 
public’s attention, such as accounting related to mergers and acquisitions, related-party 
transactions, and foreign currency translations. I have also studied the rule-making 
process in various jurisdictions – the United States, China, India, and the European 
Union. Across the span of my work, three basic findings have emerged. The findings can 
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be useful in understanding how rules are set for many other business issues, including the 
governance of our banks, the auditing of our listed companies, and the standards by 
which our insurance industry operates.  
First, on any given specific accounting issue, there are a usually just a handful of 
individuals – somewhere between five and 50 people in the world – that are truly experts 
on the subject (the Shaqs). These individuals – these subject-matter experts – are also 
usually the people with the strongest concentrated commercial interest in the outcome. 
So, importantly, there is a co-location of expertise and interest. 
Second, and perhaps not surprisingly given the first finding, the “rules of the 
game” that emerge from the political process are subtly but in significant ways tailored to 
favor these experienced few that really understand the issue. 
And third, there is no unequivocal villain in this story.  There is no one person or 
group or organization that one can point to and say, “There’s the problem; that’s the 
institution ‘capturing’ the system.” Because nobody is really an expert on and deeply 
interested in everything. The outcome of the political process looks like it was produced 
by a quilt of special interests. Experts show up when they really understand the issue at 
hand. And when they show up, there is often nobody sitting across the table from them 
supporting an alternative. So, not surprisingly, they get their way – the rules subtly favor 
their interests. 
These three findings provide an insight into the nature of the accounting system 
underlying our modern market economy – an insight into the nature of capitalism’s 
plumbing. And it appears that accounting rule-making is a patchwork of various informed 
interests seeking their own ends. But there is another, more important conclusion from 
this investigation – the problem in accounting foreshadows a broader problem with how 
some of the most critical institutions of capitalism are determined. I call this the problem 
of “thin political markets.”  
Let me illustrate with an example. 
A thin political market in operation  
The date is May 31, 2000, and the location is an obscure office building in 
Norwalk, Connecticut, that houses the offices of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board or FASB. The FASB is a private, not-for-profit organization that has an implicit 
charter from the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) and from Congress to 
determine accounting rules for U.S. non-governmental entities. One reason why Congress 
and the SEC have created this private organization to oversee accounting rule-making is 
because the government recognizes that it does not have the know-how to do this 
directly.  
On this date in May 2000, in their offices in Norwalk, the FASB was discussing 
accounting rules for mergers and acquisitions (M&A). M&A between and across 
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companies are a critical institution of our modern market-capitalist economy. In ideal 
cases, they allow companies to fold into each other to unleash synergies that can sustain 
and grow the economy. Further, they constitute a core element of the “market for 
corporate control” – the process through which floundering companies and their 
managements are held to account by the rigors of the marketplace, embodying the 
creative destruction at the heart of capitalism.  
It turns out that the members of the FASB were not the only ones at their board 
meeting to discuss accounting for M&A in May, 2000. There were representatives from 
the accounting firms Arthur Anderson, Deloitte, and PriceWaterhouse Coopers and from 
the investment banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley also attending the meeting.1  
It is noteworthy that the two biggest investment banks of the day were attending a 
private meeting of the accounting regulator as accounting rules for mergers and 
acquisitions were being decided. But, on some level, this makes perfect sense, because 
who understands M&A better than the investment banks? After all, facilitating M&A is 
what investment banks do. 
Mergers and acquisitions are a big deal in any market economy. In the last 30 
years, the size of M&A deals in the U.S. has approximated $44 trillion.2 And these deals 
have made the investment banks and investment bankers very rich. But there has been a 
lot of academic work in business schools suggesting that, on average, M&A deals destroy 
value for shareholders. This evidence comes from looking at changes in the stock prices 
of acquiring firms on the announcement dates of acquisitions – those changes are, on 
average, negative.3  
When confronted with this evidence, managers of acquiring firms often argue that 
stock markets cannot immediately appreciate the complexities and nuances of value-
creation from an acquisition. To judge an acquisition’s performance one requires more 
long-term metrics, they say. This is where accounting rules for M&A come in. After all, 
accounting rules are supposed to provide investors and other stakeholders with long-term 
accountability metrics of firm and managerial performance.  
The key issue in accounting for M&A is what to do with the purchase premium. 
The purchase premium is the excess an acquiring firm pays for a target firm over the 
current value of the target’s assets less the target’s liabilities. Say I bought your local 
coffee shop for $100,000. The shop has assets of $75,000, but debt of $30,000. Then, the 
assets less the debt are valued at $45,000, and my purchase price of $100,000 reflects a 
premium of $55,000. Accountants refer to this excess or purchase premium as 
“goodwill.” So the key issue in accounting for M&A is how to account for acquired 
goodwill.  
In theory, acquired goodwill generally represents future profits that an acquiring 
firm hopes to actualize from a merger with a target firm. These future profits might be 
realized by synergistically combining the two firms – for example, by introducing the 
target firm’s customer base to the acquiring firm’s product line.  
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If we are going to create sound accounting for M&A, then as the revenues 
associated with these hypothesized future profits are recognized in an acquiring firm’s 
income statement, the associated costs must also be recognized. The idea here is pretty 
basic. For a good measure of profit, one needs to deduct from revenues the costs 
associated with generating those revenues. In the case of M&A, these costs include the 
cost of acquiring goodwill – since without acquiring such goodwill, the revenues and 
profits wouldn’t have been realized. 
In practice, it is difficult to know precisely which revenues in the future are 
directly related to an acquisition. So, to create an approximate matching of revenues to 
costs, acquiring firms were required to spread the cost of acquired goodwill over the 
period they estimated the revenues from an acquisition to accrue. For instance, if the cost 
of goodwill from an acquisition was $100 million and the revenues from that acquisition 
were expected to be generated over 10 years, the acquiring firm would recognize $10 
million of goodwill as an expense in its income statement each year.  
The investment banks present at the FASB meeting to discuss accounting for 
M&A in May, 2000, did not like this approach. The $10 million expense each year 
created a “drag” on acquiring firms’ income statements. This made the acquirers look less 
profitable, which, in turn, was bad for business for the investment banks. So, on that day 
in May, 2000, the investment banks suggested another approach.  
Instead of expensing a portion of goodwill every year, they suggested, why not 
ask the managers of the acquiring firms to tell us, on a time-to-time basis, whether the 
goodwill was still worth its face value. The manager can be asked to generate a periodic 
“fair value” estimate of goodwill, they said. If that fair-value estimate is above the 
goodwill’s face value, no expense is required. If it is below the face value, the acquiring 
firm will take a loss to the extent of the difference. 
There are two problems with this approach. The first problem is that even as 
revenues associated with an acquisition are being recognized in a firm’s income 
statement, its costs – particularly the costs of goodwill – are not. This violates a basic 
premise of good accounting and accountability – that profit equals revenues minus costs.  
The second problem is as follows. If you ask a manager what is the current fair 
value of the future profits he expects to generate from an acquisition, you are unlikely to 
receive a number that is objectively verifiable. The manager’s estimate is as good as his 
incentives to skew his own performance. If the manager wants to look good, he can 
generate a high fair-value estimate for the goodwill and thus avoid taking an expense to 
the firm’s income statement.  
Thus, there are serious concerns with the proposal the investment banks were 
advancing at the May 2000 meeting with the FASB. But the investment banks had allies. 
The audit firms also at that meeting endorsed the investment banks’ position. And, at 
another private FASB board meeting on the subject, this one in September 2000, the 
board heard from other experts on M&A. Cisco Systems, at the time one of the world’s 
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most valuable companies and a serial acquirer, the Technology Network, an industry 
association representing M&A-hungry Silicon Valley firms, and Merrill Lynch, the other 
big investment bank, were all represented at the September meeting. These groups 
lobbied for accounting rules for M&A that were substantially similar to those advanced 
by the guests at the May meeting.4  
By February of 2001, the FASB issued new accounting rules that were largely in 
line with the position advocated by the investment banks and their allies. Goodwill was 
no longer to be regularly expensed on the income statement. It was only to be expensed 
when managers of acquiring firms determined via fair-value estimates that it had lost 
value.5 Thus, a multi-trillion dollar industry where long-term performance measurement 
is key to ensuring that value is not destroyed ends up with accounting rules that seem 
inconsistent with even basic tenets of what constitutes a profit.  
Of course, it is reasonable to ask how these new rules are actually being 
implemented. After all, it is possible that managers are not abusing their discretion to 
determine the fair value of goodwill. In a coauthored study, I investigated how often 
managers appropriately own up to botched-up acquisitions by recognizing a timely 
goodwill loss on their firms’ income statements. In cases where a goodwill loss was very 
likely due, the study found that only 31% of firms faithfully recognized the loss. The 
remaining 69% of firms were driven by a number of self-serving motives to avoid such a 
loss. One such motive is the managers’ own bonuses – if a goodwill loss is likely to affect 
the acquiring-firm CEO’s bonus, he is less likely to recognize the loss.6  
The case of Cisco Systems, one firm that lobbied for the highly discretionary 
M&A accounting rules we have today, illustrates this point. Among market experts, 
Cisco is known for its aggressive use of M&A. As of the fiscal year ended July 2013, the 
company had a goodwill balance of nearly $22 billion on its books, against total assets of 
about $101 billion.7 And, despite a nearly 70% decline in its market value from 2000 
through 2001 (about $350 billion), a decline that has largely persisted through 2013, the 
company has not recorded any substantial goodwill-related loss in its financial statements 
over that period. But, over that period, its CEO, John Chambers, has netted over $200 
million in pay. The highly subjective goodwill rules the company helped put in place 
have facilitated in part this accounting feat.  
And so, in the process to determine accounting for M&A, informed special-
interest groups such as investment banks and frequent corporate acquirers, facing little 
opposition to their agenda from the general public and its intermediaries, were able to 
secure rules that favored their own interests. With trillions of dollars and the effective 
allocation of investments in our capital markets at stake, any individual with investments 
in the stock market or with a broad stake in the U.S. economy should be at least slightly 
concerned.  
If the costs to the rest of us are so real, why, one might ask, were the audit firms 
on board as this all happened? Why did they not step in and intervene for ordinary 
investors? After all, auditors have to certify, under threat of liability, the financial 
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statements of the firms involved. And, if the fair-value estimates on goodwill are so 
unverifiable and if managers are gaming those estimates, wouldn’t the auditors be 
exposing themselves to such liability?  
The issue here is that the determination of audit rules – like the determination of 
accounting rules for M&A – is a process occurring largely outside the public eye. The 
audit rules are influenced by the audit firms themselves, because they have the most 
relevant expertise on the matter.  
Consider, in particular, the auditing rule that deals with auditors’ responsibilities 
on the kinds of fair-value estimates managers have to make when accounting for 
goodwill from M&A. This rule – known to insiders as “SAS 101” – creates broad 
insulation from liability for the auditors involved, provided they follow a pre-specified 
protocol of actions. In justifying this rule, the auditing standard-setter implied that fair-
value estimates are inherently so unreliable that it would be unreasonable to hold auditors 
liable for their abuse.8 This observation is especially ironical because audit firms were 
supporting the use of such fair-value estimates when lobbying on the determination of 
accounting standards!  
For instance, when lobbying on what goodwill accounting rules should look like 
in early 2001, the audit firm Ernst & Young did not resist the use of highly subjective 
fair-value estimates to infer goodwill write-offs.9 But when later challenged in a 
shareholder lawsuit for not appropriately flagging goodwill write-off avoidance in a 
client’s financial reports, the audit firm took another tack. Its lawyers argued in a brief to 
the court considering the lawsuit that fair-value estimates are “inherently judgmental and 
predictive,” reflecting “opinions about what may occur in the future.” Moreover, the brief 
added, Ernst & Young’s own liability was limited because “an auditor does not make 
predictions about the company’s future business prospects.”10  
These clever arguments about the subjectivity of the goodwill rules carried the 
day in the lawsuit, but Ernst & Young (or, for that matter, any other large audit firm) has 
not been called to account for its own inconsistency in supporting the introduction of 
such accounting rules in the first place.   
The preceding narrative on how some of our M&A accounting rules came to be is 
not unique. Subtly and seemingly inoffensively, across a number of different issue areas 
and a number of geographies, special interests with the information edge on a given 
esoteric issue in accounting standard-setting have been able to shape the rules of the 
game to benefit themselves. This is what I refer to as the problem of thin political 
markets.  
Understanding thin political markets 
A thin political market, at its essence, has two basic features. The first is that a 
concentrated commercial interest, also known as a “special-interest group,” has deeply 
relevant expertise on the issue at hand. Put differently, there is a co-location of interest 
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and expertise in the political process. This was the case with the investment banks on 
M&A accounting described earlier.  
The second is that the public interest – also known as the “general interest” – is 
diffuse. It is diffuse because the specific issue at hand has a small individual impact on 
each member of the public. It is also diffuse because the issue at hand is not salient in the 
public’s mind. It is not a hot, current-affairs topic like Medicare or Social Security. 
Instead, it is a “boring” topic like accounting rules – one doesn’t often encounter dinner 
party conversations lamenting the state of accounting rule-making.  
At first glance, the features of a thin political market might appear quite similar to 
the features that define the classic collective-action problem that political scientists have 
been studying for at least the past fifty years.11 The collective-action problem arises in 
political processes where a few big players dominate many small players because the 
many small players have little individual incentive to organize themselves. Think a giant 
mining company trying to loosen environmental standards in a country – the residents of 
that nation might care, but maybe not enough to resist the concentrated onslaught of the 
mining company.  
Social-science research has made a lot of progress in understanding the collective-
action problem and managing its key implication – the possibility of regulatory “capture” 
by the big players in a political process. A vibrant stream of research, including work by 
the late Nobelist Elinor Ostrom, has explored how communities can address the 
collective-action problem and thus attenuate the chances of regulatory capture.12  
Unfortunately, the problem of thin political markets is distinct from the simple 
collective-action problem. In two powerful ways it is more subtle – and thus potentially 
more dangerous.  
First, in a thin political market the source of big players’ expertise – the source of 
their knowledge advantage – is experience based. This means that the knowledge they 
bring is tacit or implicit rather than codified or explicit.13 For instance, the reason large 
auditing firms like Ernst & Young are so influential in the determination of accounting 
rules (beyond their monetary incentives to shape the rules) is that in their day-to-day 
business they acquire experience that gives them unique insights into what kind of rules 
will work and what will not.  
In a classic collective-action situation, we’ve learned to reduce the threat of big 
players capturing regulations by bringing in outside experts who don’t have strong 
commercial interests in the outcome. In a thin political market, such experts don’t exist. 
For instance, in the case of accounting rules, those who might otherwise serve as the 
“outside experts” – e.g., accounting professors – cannot really substitute for the 
knowledge of insiders such as the large audit firms, because they are not in the practice of 
auditing. The implication here is that in thin political markets it is impossible to separate 
commercial interest in the outcome from relevant expertise to determine the outcome.  
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The second distinction between the problem of thin political markets and classic 
collective action is that thin political markets occur in areas of low salience with the 
general public. The capture of regulations by big players (or special-interest groups) is a 
threat in many areas of public governance, but a relatively higher awareness among the 
public of this possibility induces intermediaries such as politicians or the media to act as 
safeguards for the public interest.  
For instance, on high-awareness regulatory issues such as healthcare reform, 
politicians seeking reelection and the media seeking to attract readership are more 
vigilant.14 By contrast, the inconspicuousness of issues being determined in thin political 
markets – e.g., accounting rules – means there is little monitoring of the special interests 
by public intermediaries. Politicians don’t run election campaigns on the promise to fix 
accounting rules, and the media can seldom be bothered with such complex issues either.  
The problem of thin political markets in the determination of accounting rules has 
implications for us all. As I noted earlier, accounting is a critical institution in the 
functioning of modern market capitalism. If accounting rules are opportunistically 
subverted in ways that benefit an informed few, the rest of us are misled in our 
investment decisions at potentially great cost.  
But thin political markets are not limited to the context of accounting rules. Other 
esoteric areas of setting the rules of the game for the capitalist system are also likely to be 
thin political markets. For instance, the determination of rules for auditing of companies, 
the determination of actuarial rules, and the determination of bank-governance rules can 
all be described as thin political markets. Each of these areas is critical to the modern 
capital-market system, each is dominated by relevant industry experts, and each is largely 
outside the public eye and intermediaries for the public. Even as a business-school 
professor, I seldom attend cocktail parties where the state of actuarial rule-making is the 
subject of informed chatter.  
The problem of thin political markets does not bode well for the long-term 
legitimacy of market capitalism. For capitalism to work, for self-interested profit-seeking 
by competitive firms to deliver aggregate prosperity, we must get certain basic rules of 
the game right. For instance, markets are not “efficient” in the sense of maximizing 
aggregate wealth if there is collusion and information asymmetry. But if our market 
system is operating such that our accounting and auditing rules are being gamed by a few 
key players, then collusive and manipulative outcomes are likely. Markets under such 
circumstances, rather than creating total wealth, merely serve to reapportion wealth from 
uninformed to informed players.  
These concerns notwithstanding, there is a curious oddity about thin political 
markets. The various individuals, firms, and organizations that dominate thin political 
markets – the informed special-interest groups – are acting in a way very much consistent 
with what one would expect of good capitalists. They are acting in ways to increase their 
own profits. In fact, I call these situations thin political “markets” – rather than political 
“processes” – because the key players approach their role much as they would in any 
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other market: as self-interested profit maximizers. To these key players, shaping 
accounting rules to their benefit is just another way of building and sustaining a 
competitive advantage.  
In this spirit, these players embody what modern economic theory considers the 
role of the firm in capitalism. They embody the spirit of Milton Friedman’s famously 
influential call-to-arms – “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”15 
Why, then, is there a problem with thin political markets?  
The problem, of course, is that for profit-increasing behavior to be legitimate and 
desirable – for profit-increasing behavior to generate aggregate prosperity and wealth – 
we must have a competitive process. No one individual, group, or organization can 
dominate the outcome. But thin political markets, by definition, are one-sided. In such 
situations, expert special-interests can shape the rules of the game unopposed. 
Can this sort of behavior possibly be legitimate? Can this behavior possibly 
represent what Milton Friedman and others behind the development of modern economic 
theory had in mind?  
What is the “social responsibility” of managers in thin political markets? 
Political scientists have long known that that corporate managers use the political 
process in self-serving ways.16 As such, this is not a cause for great concern if the 
political process is well-attended – that is, if a diverse set of views across corporate 
participants and other interests groups representing labor, environment, consumer rights, 
etc., are represented in the political discourse. With such competition in politics, the self-
serving lobbying of various special-interests groups usually does equilibrate.17  
The problem with thin political markets is the absence of such political 
competition. The dominant special-interest group in a thin political market has an 
information edge over other stakeholders. Moreover, the issue being determined is so 
abstruse that it is outside the grasp of the general public. This leaves the dominant special 
interest uniquely positioned to shape the outcome in a thin political market. Under such 
circumstances, what is the “social responsibility” (to quote Milton Friedman) of that 
special-interest group? Is it still “to increase profits?” For example, is it legitimate for 
investment banks to pursue self-serving accounting rules when they have a unique and 
unrivaled ability to shape those rules?  
The answers to these questions can be found in the same logic that motivated 
Milton Friedman and others to argue the merits of self-serving profit-maximizing firms. 
Recall that Friedman said it was the social responsibility of firms to increase profits – not 
their right, or their prerogative, or even their natural tendency, but their responsibility. 
Friedman was not making a descriptive statement about the world as it is, but a normative 
statement about the world as it should be.  
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At first glance, a normative argument for self-serving behavior seems absurd. But 
the self-serving pursuit of profit is the engine of capitalism. In the presence of 
competition, profit-increasing behavior is what makes capitalism work. And when 
capitalism works, we get all of the remarkable things that a functioning capitalist society 
can deliver, such as the efficient allocation of resources across diverse human preferences 
and the capacity to empower individuals to seek their own economic destiny. Moreover, 
as numerous scholars of capitalism have pointed out, with the wealth that a capitalist 
society delivers, citizens in such a society are freed to pursue higher aims such as 
securing greater political freedoms (e.g., gay marriage) or immersing themselves in the 
arts and other leisurely pursuits.18 
Thus, Friedman, when he argued for a social responsibility toward profit seeking, 
was making an ethical argument for capitalism – an ethical argument for all of the 
benefits that a functioning capitalist system can deliver. In ethical terms, profit-seeking 
behavior is a means to an end – the end being the various socially desirable properties of 
a well-functioning capitalist system.  
Thin political markets, of course, have the same end. After all, the objective of the 
regulatory process underlying a thin political market is the enabling of the capitalist 
system. It is difficult to imagine a modern market-capitalist system effectively 
functioning without a system for appropriate accounting rules, or, for that matter, 
actuarial rules, auditing rules, and bank-governance rules. 
But in a thin political market, we do not have the competition that makes self-
serving, profit-seeking behavior okay. What we have, instead, is an informed and 
unopposed special-interest group that can, through profit seeking, capture the political 
process and opportunistically skew fundamental institutions of capitalism – such as 
accounting rules. And a market without well-designed basic rules of this nature can 
become wealth extracting rather than wealth creating. The unrestrained pursuit of profit 
in thin political markets can eventually upend both the functioning and the legitimacy of 
capitalism. The growing populist discord over income inequality and institutionalized 
corruption in the United States is perhaps an ominous warning sign that problems of this 
nature cannot be left unchecked.  
With this understanding, it becomes apparent that the social responsibility of the 
informed special-interest groups in thin political markets cannot possibly be “to increase 
profits.” Rather, their social responsibility is to preserve and advance the conditions 
under which the capitalist system can continue to thrive. Their social responsibility is to 
help design the rules of the game so that the game can be played freely, fairly, and 
effectively.  
In thin political markets the corporate managers of the dominant, informed 
special-interest groups are no longer agents for their shareholders (in whose interests they 
would ordinarily seek profits) but rather are agents for the capitalist system as a whole. 
They are stewards of the system, with the objective of getting the rules of the game right.  
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The notion that corporate managers have this dual agency – to shareholders in the 
context of competition and to the system as a whole in thin political markets – raises a 
number of issues. First, is such a dual agency legally permissible given current corporate 
law? Second, can such a dual agency be achieved in practice? How would managers 
know when to act in the interests of the system? How can they be held to account for it?   
Engineering change in thin political markets 
In the United States and in many other modern capitalist societies, officers and 
directors of a corporation have fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders. 
These fiduciary duties are sometimes misinterpreted as requiring corporate managers 
only to pursue the direct interests of their shareholders via profit seeking. In reality, 
however, the law offers wide latitude to managers to do what is in the long-term interests 
of the corporation as a whole. As Supreme Court justice Samuel Alito noted recently, 
“While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make 
money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at 
the expense of everything else, and many do not do so.”19  
Thus, there is nothing in the law to prevent corporate managers from acting in the 
interest of the system as a whole in thin political markets. Preserving the system of 
capitalism by preventing its capture in thin political markets is indisputably in the long-
term interest of the corporation – because, after all, the corporate entity derives its 
legitimacy and its license to operate from the legitimacy of the capitalist system as a 
whole.  
Even with the legal impediment to a dual agency being addressed, there is still a 
concern that managers cannot possibly be expected to serve two masters. Celebrated 
management scholars such as Michael Jensen have sometimes argued that managers need 
a single objective function to be effective at what they do.20 In reality, this line of 
argument is a red herring. Corporate managers routinely serve in multiple agency roles in 
practice. For example, if the executive officer of one corporation is on the board of 
another, she is a fiduciary to both corporations and holds dual agency. Numerous 
prominent (and highly effective) business executives such as Eric Schmidt and John Doer 
have served in such dual-agency roles.  
But how do managers know when their agency to the system governs? How can 
they recognize thin political markets? In practice, such situations are actually easier to 
identify than they might first appear. For instance, when representatives of the largest 
investment banks and audit firms are invited to discuss with the FASB accounting rules 
for M&A, and when no representatives from the general public are present at such 
meetings, it should be pretty clear to all parties present that they are now stewards for the 
system as whole.  
Common sense and good leadership instincts can reliably alert managers to 
situations where they bear responsibilities to the system. Many other professions where 
such dual agencies exist seem to generally manage the competing responsibilities well. 
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Consider, for example, public prosecutors, who bear dual responsibilities – to prosecute a 
given case to the fullest extent of the law in an adversarial system; and to advance the 
course of justice and equity as a whole. There are times when during the pursuit of a 
particular defendant at trial new information comes to light that exonerates the defendant. 
In such times, good prosecutors should – and, indeed, most prosecutors do – recognize 
that their responsibility to advance justice and equity trumps their responsibility to be 
adversarial with the defendant. A similar expectation of corporate managers in thin 
political markets is neither infeasible nor unreasonable.  
The first step in achieving such a transformation is reexamining the curriculum in 
our nation’s business schools and economics departments. Despite a general recognition 
among academics that profit-seeking alone cannot be the purpose of the corporation, the 
teaching of economics, finance, and corporate strategy remains largely uninfluenced by 
this view. A deep exploration of issues around the ethics of capitalism and profit-seeking 
is often relegated to courses taught outside business and economics departments. Such 
courses are usually optional to business and economics majors, so it is possible for these 
graduates to enter the workforce without a complete understanding of the ethics of profit 
seeking.  
Deepening the curriculum in our colleges and universities is one way to engage 
the next generation of business leaders in conversations about their responsibilities to 
society in thin political markets. But these young leaders are incubated and promoted by 
the existing corporate elite and, moreover, the problem of thin political markets is 
current. So efforts to change behaviors in thin political markets must equivalently focus 
on senior business leaders.  
Here, we cannot overstate the need for more focused and forceful mechanisms to 
emphasize managers’ agency responsibility to the capitalist system in thin political 
markets. After all, the short-term economic incentives to act to the contrary are often too 
sweet to pass on. Here are three practicable mechanisms that can be introduced in thin 
political markets such as accounting rule-making. 
First, managers lobbying in these political markets should be encouraged to 
publicly recognize their agency responsibility to the system. They should be encouraged 
to assert under penalty of liability that they are representing the public interest in their 
lobbying. This is akin to a professional oath a doctor is expected to take before being 
credentialed. In the context of accounting rule-making, I propose a scenario where, for 
example, when members of an investment bank are meeting privately with the FASB to 
discuss a rule change, all individuals present begin the meeting by affirming orally and in 
writing that the positions they are advancing are in the public’s interest. This might seem 
like a superficial or an ineffective step, but research has shown that getting individuals to 
explicitly recognize their responsibilities can have a significant impact on their behavior. 
For example, results from experimental studies on issue framing have found that the 
simple act of declaring that a form will be completed truthfully reduces dishonesty when 
completing the form.21  
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Second, a group of subject-matter experts – e.g., academics, retired corporate 
executives, and retired regulators – should be invited to evaluate outcomes in various thin 
political markets. In accounting rule-making, I propose a decennial public review of the 
FASB’s output by a group of experts who have no prior ties with either the FASB or its 
most active constituents such as the largest audit firms. Such a review will no doubt be 
imperfect, not least because the experts will be at a knowledge disadvantage relative to 
the insiders who shape outcomes in accounting rule-making. But the review will 
nevertheless shed some light on the political process and can serve as a follow-up 
accountability mechanism for managerial lobbying. If the results of such a review are 
publicized in civil society, managers and rule makers engaged in narrow capture will be 
at least subject to some reputational penalties. 
Third, managers identified as exhibiting public leadership in thin political markets 
should be publicly felicitated. Social recognition plays an important role in stimulating 
competitive individuals to achieve their best. For example, many business leaders are 
motivated to build successful firms as much for the recognition they receive from doing 
so as for any monetary rewards. This is particularly the case beyond a certain threshold of 
wealth and income, where the marginal benefit of another dollar earned is often 
outweighed by the marginal benefits of social recognition. Leadership in thin political 
markets will seldom yield direct monetary rewards, so it is incumbent on us to find other 
ways to reward such leaders. By making senior managers aware of the nature of thin 
political markets and their changing responsibilities in these contexts, we can begin to 
celebrate those who show real leadership in these contexts. And on this front, business 
schools and the media have an important role to play. Just as industry titans are heralded 
in business school classrooms and on the covers of Fortune and Forbes for their 
commercial acumen, so too must they be celebrated for their public leadership in thin 
political markets.  
Conclusion 
Writing for The New York Times Magazine in 1970 about “the social 
responsibility of business,” Milton Friedman said, “I have been impressed time and again 
by the schizophrenic character of many businessmen. They are capable of being 
extremely farsighted and clearheaded in matters that are internal to their businesses. They 
are incredibly shortsighted and muddle-headed in matters that are outside their businesses 
but affect the possible survival of business in general.”22  
Reexamined in the context of the problem of thin political markets – and its 
potential to gradually but steadily erode the legitimacy of our capitalist system – this 
sentiment rings loud and true. After all, Friedman himself was very careful to 
acknowledge that his clarion call to profit-seeking in business had its limits. In his iconic 
and immensely influential book, Capitalism and Freedom, he argued that every business 
should pursue profits “so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 
engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.”23  
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My own decade-long investigation into the determination of our corporate 
accounting “rules of the game” suggests that corporate managers have sometimes lost 
sight of this very important qualification. From time-to-time, certain corporate managers 
have seen it within their purview – their “social responsibility” even – to manipulate the 
very definition of profits in the spirit of increasing profits (e.g., by changing accounting 
rules). From the perspective of the average citizen invested in the market economy, 
there’s no other way to see this behavior but as an example of the “deception or fraud” 
Friedman warned against. We have to get this to change.  
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